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Abstract 
As one of the most significant pieces of constitutional legislation enacted in the 
last century, the House of Lords Act 1999 radically reformed the membership of 
the second chamber of the Westminster parliament by removing almost all the 
hereditary peers who sat there. The act formed a key part of the constitutional 
reform agenda of the Labour government elected in 1997, but despite its massive 
majority in the house of commons, eliminating the hereditary peerage proved far 
harder than might first have been imagined. This article seeks to explore the 
events surrounding that act, the political machinations and deals leading up to it, 
the course of the legislation through parliament, and the intricacies of the process 
involved in securing constitutional reform of this magnitude. It concludes by 
examining the consequences of the act for subsequent attempts at further second 
chamber reform during the rest of the Labour government's time in office. 
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The House of Lords Act 1999 was one of the most significant pieces of 
constitutional legislation enacted during the twentieth century, and it (partially) 
fulfilled a goal that persisted as a key part of the Lords reform agenda since the 
Parliament Act 1911: that is, the removal of the hereditary peers from the second 
chamber. In locating the Act within the context of a two-stage approach to Lords 
reform, the Labour government believed it could remove the most democratically 
offensive part of the chamber, and then proceed to identify a clear position with 
respect to compositional reform behind which the party could unite. However, 
the decade that followed the Act was marked by policy uncertainty and 
confusion, which rendered the subsequent processes of Lords reform muddled 
and rudderless, and ironically undermined what was, in fact, a major 
constitutional change with lasting and substantial consequences for Westminster 
politics. 
 
The rationale for reform 
The Labour Party has, throughout its history, had a highly changeable policy 
towards the House of Lords, and as late as 1983 was committed in its general 
election manifesto to abolishing the chamber altogether, and to redesigning 
Westminster as a unicameral parliament.1 The Conservative-dominated 
hereditary peerage in the upper chamber proved in the post-war era to be a source 
of considerable frustration to Labour governments, both on points of policy and 
on points of principle. Not only did a hereditary chamber offend the 
democratising instincts of the Labour Party, but the substantially outnumbered 
Labour peers in the Lords found themselves easily voted down, regardless of the 
value of the legislative points they sought to make.2 In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
general view held in the Labour Party was that a second chamber could too easily 
frustrate the wishes of a committed government of the left, and that, rather than 
expend energy and political capital on reforming it, the far more sensible option 
was to simply abolish the upper house, and focus instead on reforming the 
various practices and procedures of the democratically elected lower house in 
which the government sat. 
By 1992, however, the party’s policy had changed markedly, and 
unicameralism was abandoned in favour of support for an elected upper house.3 
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This modification reflected a growing commitment within the Labour Party to 
constitutional change more broadly, spearheaded by Labour leader John Smith, 
and demonstrated by the then Shadow Chancellor, Gordon Brown, arguing for a 
new constitutional settlement that comprised reform of the ‘indefensible’ 
unelected Lords, but which also mapped out increasingly coherent plans for 
devolution, incorporation of the ECHR, and freedom of information.4 By 1997, 
these plans had become even further embedded into the Labour Party’s policy 
infrastructure, and the commitment to ‘cleaning up’ politics and facilitating 
democratic renewal formed a cornerstone of the New Labour brand promoted by 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Policy commitments on the House of Lords 
received considerably more space in the 1997 manifesto than in previous years, 
yet also demonstrated that yet another shift in emphasis had occurred since 1992: 
 
The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-contained reform, not 
dependent on further reform in the future, the right of hereditary peers to sit 
and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by statute. This will be the first 
stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and 
representative … A committee of both Houses of Parliament will be appointed 
to undertake a wide-ranging review of possible further change and then to 
bring forward proposals for reform.5 
 
The fundamental point to note with respect to the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, 
then, is that it said nothing about the need to create an elected second chamber. 
The commitment to reform was restricted to getting rid of the hereditary peers. 
Whereas the 1992 manifesto clearly stated the party’s intent to create an elected 
House, the 1997 manifesto said nothing of the sort, instead using the rather less 
explicit language about making the chamber ‘more democratic and 
representative’, but avoiding entirely any declared statement of what this might 
mean in practice. The pragmatism of the manifesto was that it substantially 
shifted the reform terrain by committing to a two-stage process. For most of the 
twentieth century, debates about House of Lords reform were plagued by a 
contradictory certainty: certainty that the hereditary principle was indefensible in 
the context of a modern representative democracy, and the concomitant certainty 
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that no one could agree on what should replace it. By 1997, the Labour leadership 
had decided that the one way to get beyond this impasse was simply to abolish 
the right of the hereditary peers to sit and vote in parliament, and thus eradicate 
the most offensive aspect of the upper chamber, and only then start thinking 
about the far trickier matter of broader compositional reform. The new House of 
Lords policy also indicated that removing the hereditary peers did not mean that 
further reform was either necessary or guaranteed, a position that would be a 
source of considerable political annoyance for the party once in power. 
As far as House of Lords reform was concerned, then, the 1997 Labour 
Party manifesto, and its two-stage approach, was a masterclass in political 
realism. It acknowledged the lessons of the past one hundred years, and the 
failure to find agreement on what a reformed composition should look like, but 
committed nevertheless to removing the hereditary peers, and thus easily 
demonstrating the incoming government’s democratic credentials. The Labour 
Party had already tried in government to proceed with holistic second chamber 
reform in 1968-69, and do so in a cross-party fashion, an endeavour which had 
ended in failure and embarrassment. If it wished to secure any kind of reform, 
then, it needed to be able to do so by relying only on the support of its own 
members. A two-stage approach enabled a future Labour government to take 
advantage of the support within its own party for removing the hereditary peers, 
and only then think about a cross-party basis for future reform once that first 
bridge had been successfully crossed.  Indeed, simply getting rid of the hereditary 
peers seemed like a relatively straight-forward piece of constitutional reform, 
given how hard it had become to defend the hereditary principle. Yet, as the 
Labour government found out, it was neither easy nor straight-forward, and 
crucially, it was not without political costs. 
Having been out of office for almost two decades, the new Labour 
government elected in 1997 had a substantial programme of reform it wished to 
implement, and its constitutional change agenda was arguably unlike that ever 
before pursued by an incoming administration. Consequently, with its capacity 
for action initially constrained by what could be secured in terms of legislation in 
the first parliamentary session, the government necessarily had to triage its 
commitments, and by far the most important of its constitutional policies was 
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devolution and, to a lesser extent, human rights. As a result, a significant portion 
of the first session of 1997-98 was accounted for legislating for these policies,6 and 
the cabinet decided that reform of the House of Lords would be delayed until the 
second session of 1998-99. The decision to delay was a key determining factor in 
the subsequent course of House of Lords reform. The magnitude of the defeat 
suffered by the Conservative Party in 1997 left it in a state of stunned disarray in 
the House of Commons, and in almost no position to offer meaningful opposition 
to anything that the Labour government proposed in its first year.7 It is very likely 
that, had the government proceeded to legislate for the removal of the hereditary 
peers in its first parliamentary session in power, the story of the House of Lords 
Act recounted here would be rather different. As it was, however, the government 
did delay, and in so doing, allowed the Conservative opposition time to catch its 
breath and prepare for battle. 
 
Negotiating the reform process 
Action to fulfil the manifesto commitment began with the 1998 Queen’s Speech, 
which promised a bill ‘to remove the right of hereditary Peers to sit and vote in 
the House of Lords’, with the stipulation once more being made that this would 
be ‘the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more 
democratic and representative.’8 The Queen’s Speech also diverged from what 
had been promised in the manifesto, by announcing the establishment of a Royal 
Commission ‘to review further changes and speedily to bring forward proposals 
for reform.’ The manifesto had in fact pledged a joint committee of both Houses, 
which is a quite different institutional creature to a Royal Commission, with the 
latter traditionally taking far longer to reach agreed reports, and also being 
somewhat easier for governments to manage because of the different dynamics of 
the power of appointment.  
The government’s plan to remove the hereditary peers and only then 
consider further compositional reform of the upper chamber may well have been 
the best option in terms of actually securing change, but it nevertheless afforded 
the opposition a prime strategy for attack. William Hague, Leader of the 
Opposition, characterised the government’s plans for removing the hereditary 
peers as ‘constitutional vandalism’, and argued that people would want to hear 
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the conclusions of the Royal Commission before proceeding with stage one of 
reform. Hague thus exploited the soft underbelly of the two-stage process and laid 
the groundwork for Conservative opposition to the governments proposals when 
he asserted that ‘[t]he reason the Prime Minister does not want to wait for the 
royal commission is clear: he has never intended carrying out proper reform of 
the House of Lords, but wants to create a house of cronies beholden to him 
alone’.9 This two-pronged line of reasoning continued in the Commons debate on 
the Queen’s Speech, when Sir Norman Fowler argued that the government’s 
intention was ‘to introduce an assembly of appointees and placemen: a giant, 
ermine-clad quango,’ which would fail to put pressure on the government because 
such appointees would be ‘very content with their lot,’ and contended that it was 
‘utterly absurd’ to proceed with legislation in advance of either the government’s 
white paper or the conclusion of the Royal Commission.10  
The opposition were also able to make much of the fact that, in the summer 
of 1998, the government Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Richard, was fired 
because he was thought to be too strongly in favour of a substantially elected 
second chamber, and was thus at odds with the prime minister and much of the 
cabinet.11 Conservative MP Kenneth Clarke, for example, was a known advocate 
of an elected element in the second chamber, but in arguing this case for the 
reformed Lords,12 strategically illustrated the deep divisions within the 
government regarding the merits of having elected peers in the upper house. This, 
along with the absence of any coherent plan for what would happen in the 
putative stage two of reform, set the scene for the legislative process that 
accompanied the House of Lords Bill. 
The House of Lords Bill was formally introduced into the House of 
Commons on 19 January 1999, but the contentious nature of the legislation had 
already been revealed well before that date. Throughout 1998, secret talks took 
place between the Labour and Conservative Leaders in the House of Lords (Lord 
Richard and Lord Cranborne respectively), at the prompting of the prime 
minister, aimed at finding some kind of bipartisan approach to reform.13 The 
central fear was that the Conservatives would abandon the Salisbury convention 
and oppose the legislation in the second chamber, thus causing a scenario in 
which the government was forced to use the Parliament Acts in order to remove 
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the hereditary peers. It was exactly this kind of protracted constitutional battle 
which the government was keen to avoid. In addition, it was hoped that the secret 
negotiations would prepare the groundwork for a possible ‘big bang’ approach to 
reform whereby the government would delay removing all the hereditary peers in 
exchange for Conservative support for an at least partly elected second chamber.14 
However, the complete absence of any united Labour government position with 
respect to the merits of an elected Lords, and the deep reservations of the prime 
minister himself on the matter, meant that the talks yielded little by way of an 
agreed approach on future composition.  
Nonetheless, the talks did succeed in mapping a way forward for the 
elimination of the hereditary peers. Working with Lord Irvine following Lord 
Richard’s sacking, Lord Cranborne promised to neutralise the threat of the 
Conservative peers destroying the government’ reform agenda (by voting down 
the plans to remove the hereditary peers) in exchange for some of those peers 
being allowed to remain in the House. By November 1998, Cranborne had 
secured government agreement on retaining 92 hereditary peers. This comprised 
75 (one-tenth of the hereditary peerage) who would be chosen by elections in 
which only the hereditary peers would be eligible to participate; 15 hereditary 
peers who were also office holders in the chamber to ensure the efficient 
functioning of the House during the impending interim period, also chosen by 
election; and two hereditary officers of state, the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great 
Chamberlain. 
However, Cranborne was caught unawares when his own shadow cabinet 
refused to support the plan he had worked out with Irvine.15 Cranborne, not to be 
put off, ‘smuggled himself into Number 10, to discuss the deal directly with Tony 
Blair.’16 That meeting produced final agreement that the Conservative peers 
would not oppose the government so long as a number of hereditary members 
could remain in the House of Lords. However, the Leader of the Conservative 
Party, William Hague, was allegedly in the dark about Cranborne’s secret 
meeting with Blair, and, upon finding out about it, attempted to blow the deal out 
of the water by exposing it during Prime Minister’s Questions on 2 December 
1998. This was the first most Labour MPs knew of the deal to retain some 
hereditary peers,17 but the strategy of trying to instigate civil war in the Labour 
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Party backfired, because Blair simply pointed out that if some hereditary peers 
remained, then it was because the Conservative leadership in the Lords has 
agreed to such a scenario. Blair undermined Hague’s attempt to derail the deal by 
arguing that: 
 
‘even when hereditary Conservative peers are prepared to agree to change, the 
right hon. Gentleman is not. That is the absurd position to which he has 
reduced himself … We have the opportunity to reform the House of Lords 
properly, and to establish a programme that will remove hereditary peers, but 
will allow us to do that on the broadest possible basis of agreement. It is clear 
that nowadays, even when we speak to the leader of the Conservative party in 
the House of Lords, we cannot be sure that the leader of the Conservative 
party in this House is of the same mind.’18 
 
What then followed was tantamount to political farce. Although Hague fired 
Cranborne for agreeing to the deal with Tony Blair without his knowledge or 
approval, he appointed Lord Strathclyde as his successor, who had not only 
known about and supported Cranborne’s deal, but was instructed by Hague to 
honour it. Consequently, before legislation had even been introduced into 
parliament, the entire process was already mired in controversy and the basic task 
of removing the hereditary peers had become hugely contentious.  
Nonetheless, by the time the legislative stages of the House of Lords Bill 
began, the new Leader of the House of Lords, Baroness Jay, had already secured 
the cooperation of the crossbench peer, Lord Weatherill, to introduce the agreed 
amendment to reprieve the 92 hereditary peers agreed by Cranborne and Irvine. 
Weatherill had been working on his own amendment along similar lines, but was 
persuaded to substitute it for the Cranborne-Irvine plan instead, on the grounds 
that his seniority and standing in the Lords would help demonstrate the 
consensus position which the amendment sought to locate. With the amendment 
backed by the crossbenches, the Conservative peers would be in a far easier 
position to abstain from the vote, and thus ensure that the legislation could be 
secured without undue constitutional fuss. Consequently, the government white 
paper published in December 1998, which outlined the removal of the hereditary 
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peers and the creation of the Royal Commission on future reform, acknowledged 
that it would accept an amendment to reprieve the 92 peers if it meant that stage 
one of reform could be secured consensually.19 
 
The legislative process in the Commons 
The House of Lords Bill was purposefully short and simple, with the most 
important clause stating plainly that ‘No one shall be a member of the House of 
Lords by virtue of a hereditary peerage.’ The second reading debate took place in 
the Commons on 1 and 2 February 1999. Although the Leader of the Commons, 
Margaret Beckett, promoted the bill on the basis of its ‘exquisite simplicity’ in 
removing the hereditary peers,20 and while many Labour MPs kept their 
contributions to the limited issue of the hereditary peers, much of the debate 
nevertheless focused on two problematic issues: first, the politics of the Weatherill 
amendment to reprieve some of the hereditary peers, and, second, the far more 
contentious issue of what would follow this stage one of reform. 
The basic mechanics of the amendment to allow some hereditary peers to 
remain proved to be hugely controversial. Margaret Beckett acknowledged the 
agreement which had been reached to accept an amendment put forward by the 
crossbenches in the Lords to reprieve 92 peers, and stated that the government 
was ‘minded to accept it’ so long as the rest of the government’s legislative 
programme was not frustrated.21 However, she also made it plain that the 
government would not accept a similarly worded amendment if it was moved in 
the Commons instead.22 Ostensibly, the reason for this was to ensure the good 
behaviour of the House of Lords on the matter. However, the whole question of 
why the government was permitting the amendment, instead of incorporating it 
into the legislation at the start, beautifully illustrated the basis of the opposition 
that the Conservative Party was able to mount against the House of Lords Bill. Its 
own senior peers had played an integral role in bringing the reprieve amendment 
about. However, Conservatives in the House of Commons were able to exploit 
the willingness of the government to allow the second chamber to constrain its 
constitutional legislation, without courting accusations of incoherence 
themselves, precisely because the Conservative leadership in the Commons had 
not been party to the negotiating process. The strange positioning of the 
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Conservatives on the matter meant that it was, ironically, the government which 
found itself in the position of arguing that the hereditary peers were ‘utterly, 
totally, literally, indefensible,’23 while simultaneously defending the arrangement 
to keep some of them in place for an interim period of unknown duration. 
The second controversial issue which permeated the second reading debate 
concerned the process of reform following the removal of the hereditary peers. 
The Conservative MP, John Bercow, for example, asked Margaret Beckett if ‘she 
expects reform to be completed within her remaining political lifetime’, to which 
she replied in the affirmative,24 a response which looked shaky at the time, and 
which looks even shakier a decade on, but which was in fact the only response 
that could have been offered. Despite Beckett’s argument that consideration of 
stage two could only usefully proceed once the hereditary membership had been 
dealt with and the impact of the Conservative Party on the second chamber had 
been at least somewhat reigned in,25 the fact remained that this was an entirely 
new argument fashioned to justify the comprise that had been reached with the 
Conservative peers and which had never formed part of the Labour government’s 
plans. In this respect, then, the government found itself in tricky political waters 
throughout the parliamentary process of enacting the House of Lords Bill, 
principally because the Bill was a compromise which emphatically breached the 
Labour Party’s manifesto commitment. The tone of the Commons debate belied 
the deep concerns that existed not only across but also within the parties, most 
notably the Labour Party, whose members had, after all, been under the 
impression as late as December 1998 that they were going to remove all 
hereditary peers from the second chamber. The realisation that this was no longer 
official party policy, at least in the short term, consequently led many Labour 
MPs to question the veracity of the party’s longer-term commitment to Lords 
reform. 
Fundamentally, although the government’s political strategy was to separate 
stage one from stage two, its refusal to state its own preference for what a fully 
reformed second chamber would ultimately look like, and to then defend that 
preference, gave much firepower to the opposition parties in the Commons. The 
government of course explained that it had not indicated a preference because it 
wanted to wait for the outcome of the Royal Commission inquiry, and that ‘it 
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would be insulting to ask it to consider all those matters having stated what the 
end process should be.’26 To the extent that the House of Lords Bill was a 
parliamentary done deal before it was even introduced, the only feasible 
opposition strategy was to abandon all serious defence of the hereditary principle 
(the Conservatives had in fact defended the hereditary principle in the House of 
Lords in the 1997 election campaign), and focus instead on the evident divisions 
within the Labour Party with respect to the increasingly symbolic stage two. And 
what the second reading debate demonstrated was the variety of views which 
existed on the Labour benches about what a fully reformed second chamber 
should look like in compositional terms. The different kinds of options outlined 
during the debate are too numerous and diverse to list here, covering a range of 
combinations of elected and appointed elements, with various arguments 
forwarded about how an elected membership would impact on the legitimacy of 
the House, all of which illustrated the difficulty the government could expect if it 
decided to pursue one single compositional option at some future point without 
ensuring its own backbenchers were on board. The idea of creating a unicameral 
parliament was even broached seriously at this time,27 an issue which was to have 
a significant impact on subsequent reform processes. Also under scrutiny was the 
extent to which the government would adhere to the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission once its report was published, and whether or not it was 
useful to have such a Commission if the government planned to pursue a 
particular reform strategy regardless of what it said,28 a point made by the former 
prime minister, John Major on the second day of the debate. On this point, the 
veteran Labour MP Tony Benn argued that, given the ‘immensely complex’ 
deliberations of the Royal Commission and any future Joint Committee, and the 
‘complex legislation’ that would be required to enact compositional reform, there 
was a genuine fear that the interim House ‘will become the permanent solution.’29 
Nonetheless, the important division on the second reading saw a comfortable 
outcome for the government, and the Bill passed by 381 votes to 135, and passed 
its third reading debate on 16 March 1999 by 340 votes to 132. 
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The legislative process in the Lords 
Once the House of Lords Bill was safely in the second chamber, where it arrived 
on 17 March 1999, things became rather more complicated, and it was at this 
point in the legislative process that the content of the bill underwent the most 
change. In his opening remarks on the second reading debate, Lord Strathclyde 
noted that the only certainty about the whole reform process was that ‘no one 
expects this Bill in this form to become law,’30 and continued the Conservatives 
attack on the legislation on the grounds that it pre-empted the Royal Commission 
and that the government had to be in a position to state what stage two would 
involve before embarking on stage one. Strathclyde also softened up the ground 
for the Weatherill amendment, stating that retaining some hereditary peers would 
ensure that the government had to complete the reform process, while also 
placating the Conservative hereditary membership by arguing that the 
amendment ‘falls well short of making the Bill acceptable.’31 Lord Weatherill 
defended the amendment that bore his name on the grounds that it would 
facilitate stage one, on which the government had a clear manifesto commitment, 
and it would also ‘provide some kind of reassurance of the Government’s 
seriousness of intent to proceed to stage two.’32  
 However, the Weatherill amendment was not the only issue on which the 
House of Lords had to reflect. Michael Cockerell, then a BBC journalist 
observing the removal of the hereditary peers for a documentary series, outlined 
the work undertaken by the bill team as it attempted to deal with the various 
amendments put forward by hereditary peers ‘who were masters of parliamentary 
procedure.’33 Lord Falconer told Cockerell that ‘the way the opposition went in 
the Bill, unlike any other Bill I’d ever seen, was it became an incredibly sort of 
intense legal debate, with frankly mad legal propositions being advanced.’ One of 
those related to an amendment from Earl Ferrers, about whether the word 
‘hereditary’ should be preceded by ‘a’ or ‘an’, with the bill team and the House of 
Lords having no choice but to commit time to the discussion of such amendments 
to ensure that the legislation could stand up to legal scrutiny.  
Of potentially more importance, though, were two particular issues about 
the broader implications of the bill with respect to its likely effects, issues which 
delayed its continued progress. The first related to the language used to refer to 
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hereditary peers in the bill, and the legalities of the Writ of Summons. Lord 
Mayhew of Twysden argued that the language was ‘uncertain in its effects and 
would leave the position of most hereditary Peers uncertain if the Bill was 
enacted.’34 The second issue related to whether the House of Lords Bill, once 
enacted, would breach the provisions of the Treaty of Union 1707. Lord Gray 
argued that a fundamental element of the Union between England and Scotland 
was that the latter had hereditary representation in the House of Lords 
guaranteed by statute, and that if there was no such representation, then the 
Treaty of Union would be breached.35 The House of Lords referred both these 
matters to the Committee for Privileges. Although this committee decided that 
there was no case to answer with either of these concerns,36 it did not report until 
after the summer recess, and it was therefore October 1999 before these legal 
matters had been resolved to the satisfaction of the upper house.  
Nonetheless, the effective substance of the House of Lords Bill was altered 
not only by the government’s acceptance of the Weatherill amendment which 
reprieved 92 hereditary peers, but also because of the nuance of that amendment 
and its longer term implications. The government, not wishing its short, simple 
bill to be complicated by electoral arrangements for the reprieved peers, passed 
the question off to the House of Lords Procedure Committee, which reported in 
July 1999, and outlined new House standing orders to facilitate the Weatherill 
amendment provisions.37 These new standing orders essentially outlined a series 
of complex electoral arrangements through which the 15 places for office holders 
would be elected by all hereditary peers, while the remaining 75 places would be 
divided up between the parties, and the reprieved peers from each party would be 
chosen separately by the hereditary peers from those parties. However, the 
Weatherill amendment also ensured that when a reprieved hereditary peer died, 
he or she would be replaced by means of a by-election, with the eligible 
candidates comprising the rest of the expelled peers and the electorate being the 
hereditary peers of the party in question inside the Lords. This mechanism was 
pursued in order to ensure that the total number of hereditary peers inside the 
second chamber remained fixed at 92 until the second stage of reform coulc be 
secured, and so that the inclusion of the reprieved hereditary peers was not 
undone over time as they die.  
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Donald Shell observed of these electoral mechanisms for the hereditary 
peers that ‘a major measure of constitutional reform has been enacted making 
provision of such nonsense’ and that ‘the report of the Lords Procedure 
Committee that drew up these rules must be considered one of the most hilarious 
documents ever published by such a body.’38 Indeed, when reading the Procedure 
Committee minutes and discussions on this matter, and the various analyses of 
whether life peers should be permitted to participate in the elections, it is difficult 
not to think that the whole thing was some kind of constitutional joke. Yet, so 
keen was the government to get the House of Lords Bill onto the statute book, 
and so much did it apparently fear that the hereditary peers might well snap 
around at the last possible moment and the vote the whole thing down, that it 
was seemingly willing to agree to all kinds of parliamentary foolishness that must 
surely have had the more seasoned of the hereditary peers doubled over with 
mirth. Nonetheless, these provisions within the Weatherill amendment ensured 
that the House of Lords approved the bill at third reading by 221 votes to 81, with 
the vast bulk of the Conservative peers abstaining from the vote. 
 
Constitutional and parliamentary consequences 
One of the most bizarre, and certainly unintended, constitutional consequences of 
the House of Lords Act, which reached the statute books on 11 November 1999, 
was that it brought a hugely questionable form of democracy into the second 
chamber, whereby hereditary peers, although excluded by law from sitting and 
voting in the Lords, could still gain membership of it under that same Act if their 
hereditary colleagues voted for them either in the elections which took place in 
1999 or in a by-election upon the death of one of the reprieved peers. That this 
arrangement could be put in place, given that the original intentions of the 
Labour Party were to remove all of the hereditary peers completely, demonstrates 
the irrational fear which gripped the Labour government after just a year in office. 
Despite its towering Commons majority, and the obvious use it could make of the 
rhetoric surrounding its mandate to implement a manifesto commitment, the 
Labour government nevertheless shrank from proceeding unilaterally even with 
the limited task of removing the hereditary peers, a task which it was almost 
impossible to argue against from the perspective of modern representative 
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democracy. So eager was it to find consensus, and thus avoid a constitutional 
impasse which could only be resolved by using the Parliament Acts, that it did 
not really stop to consider whether there was anything behind the threat from the 
hereditary peers to hold up the government’s legislative programme if it tried to 
evict them from the second chamber. Given the popularity of the Labour 
government at that time, it is doubtful whether such a strategy, if utilised, would 
have resulted in anything other than a huge public backlash against the hereditary 
peers and an unequivocal government victory with added political capital to boot. 
 Yet, even after the House of Lords Act was passed, there remained the far 
more complicated question of what stage two of reform would look like and when 
it would happen. In the decade after the hereditary peers were expelled from the 
second chamber, there was no further compositional reform in the House of 
Lords, despite several attempts to secure it. In casting Lords reform in terms of a 
two-stage approach, it became inevitable that a major consequence of (partially) 
securing stage one would be constant questioning about stage two. The Royal 
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords reported in January 2000, and 
recommended a largely appointed chamber.39 The report was not well received in 
the media,40 nor was the government’s subsequent commitment to a policy in 
which elected members would be in a minority in a reformed Lords.41 In 2002, 
the reformist Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook, attempted to upend 
the government’s policy on a nominated chamber42 by appointing a Joint 
Committee on Reform of the House of Lords, some six years after it had been 
promised in the 1997 election manifesto. A House of Commons Public 
Administration Committee report published in February 2002 had located a 
‘centre of gravity’ amongst MPs for a second chamber that was at least 60 per 
cent elected.43 The Joint Committee was tasked with acting on this finding by 
formulating a series of options for different kinds of composition, and outlining 
the various advantages and disadvantages of each, in preparation for 
parliamentary votes on them which, Cook hoped, would result in a clearly 
expressed preference of what most MPs would consider to be an acceptable 
composition in the upper house. The Joint Committee’s report,44 which outlined 
seven options ranging from fully appointed to fully elected, and with different 
mixed proportions in between (for example, 60 per cent elected, 40 per cent 
 16 
nominated, and vice versa) was debated in parliament on 4 February 2003. 
However, the Commons were unable to unite behind any single compositional 
option in the division, with none of those on offer securing a majority, even 
although the 80 per cent elected option was defeated by just three votes.45 The 
entire process consequently ended in total farce, and demonstrated not only the 
anxiety that gripped the Commons about what an elected second chamber might 
mean for its own democratic legitimacy, but also the extent to which raw politics 
dictated the outcome of the 2003 vote, with the Conservative Party working 
specifically in order to embarrass the government over the entire Lords reform 
affair, and with a significant minority of MPs promoting a unicameral option, the 
strength of support for which surprised the frontbenches.46 Further such 
embarrassment was secured in March 2007, near the end of the Westminster 
career of prime minister Tony Blair, when another Commons vote this time 
backed a 100 per cent and an 80 per cent elected second chamber with majorities 
of 113 and 38 respectively, although the strategic voting behaviour of MPs in 
favour of a unicameral parliament also inflated these numbers in order to 
complicate things for the government.47 This support for an elected House was 
not only a massive reversal of the 2003 outcome, but was also a substantial snub 
to Blair, whose own preferences for a largely nominated second chamber had 
stalled progress on stage two throughout his premiership. It also corresponded 
with the imminent arrival of the new prime minister, Gordon Brown, whose own 
preferences for an elected chamber were well known. Despite this, it was not until 
near the end of his premiership that the House of Lords was addressed, in the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2008-09. Yet, this did not seek to 
take forward stage two, nor even speedily to complete stage one, but instead 
aimed to secure the far more limited task of ending the process of hereditary peer 
by-elections, thus facilitating their eventual removal through atrophy. At the time 
of writing, it remains to be seen whether the government will test the 
Conservative Party’s policy on a predominantly elected chamber by introducing a 
bill near the end of the parliament that would seek to create just that.48  
Consequently, although the incoming Labour government in 1997 pledged 
to remove all the hereditary peers and then consider more fundamental 
compositional reform, the fact remains that, at the end of their time in office, a 
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major point of contention concerns the continued existence of some hereditary 
peers in parliament and the total lack of political will on the part of government to 
continue the process of reform. Indeed, had the government been as bold with 
House of Lords reform as it had been with devolution, the complexion of 
Westminster would be quite different today, and the basis on which second 
chamber reform discussions take place would be rather different also. 
There is a yet another consequence of the House of Lords Act 1999 which 
has slightly different implications. To the extent that there was no clearly worked 
out plan for stage two, opponents of stage one were able to argue during the 
parliamentary debates that accompanied the House of Lords Act that stripping 
the hereditary peers from the second chamber left it ‘much more in the power of 
the serving Prime Minister, and would make it a party political machine 
supporting the Government in power.’49 The idea that stage one would simply 
create a House of ‘Tony’s cronies’ which the Labour government would be happy 
to maintain, because the interim House was a pushover as far as legislation was 
concerned, was a compelling argument when it was made in 1999, but one which 
has not turned out to be accurate. Research has demonstrated that, far from 
becoming a more subservient chamber, the House of Lords has become far more 
assertive since the removal of most of the hereditary peers, has an increasingly 
important impact on government policy, and offers far more scrutiny obstacles to 
legislation than does the House of Commons.50 While the issue of how legitimacy 
is conceived is a difficult one,51 the life peers nevertheless seem to feel less 
encumbered with the hereditary peers removed, and more willing to fulfil the 
broad range of parliamentary functions ascribed to the second chamber.  
This has impacted on the continued debate about what a reformed second 
chamber should look like in compositional terms. With the House of Lords 
increasingly demonstrating the valuable task it performs in the legislative process, 
those opposed to an elected chamber are now in possession of mounting evidence 
about the capability and utility of an appointed chamber at Westminster, evidence 
which those who favour an elected House must formulate increasingly convincing 
arguments against. Therefore, a major consequence of the House of Lords Act 
1999, and the two-stage process of reform in which it was embedded, is that it 
brought about an interim House which was hugely capable of demonstrating its 
 18 
functional value. Nonetheless, despite the failure to proceed to stage two, removal 
of most of the hereditary peers from the second chamber in itself represented a 
massive constitutional change for Westminster, and proved that parliamentary 
reform need not always be incremental. 
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